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Abstract
It has been debated whether quantum mechanics and special rela-
tivity are incompatible and whether there is a preferred Lorentz frame
if they are incompatible. Bell’s theorem is an important cornerstone,
but it does not give us a definite positive answer due to the existence of
supplementary assumptions or theoretical loopholes; there are unitary
quantum theories which evade Bell’s theorem and claim that they are
compatible with special relativity.
In this paper, I address the important issue of whether unitary
quantum theories are compatible with special relativity. I propose
a new Gedankenexperiment, a variant of the EPR-Bohm experiment
with a superobserver who can undo a measurement. In this experiment,
there is a stronger correlation (between the results of two spacelike
separated measurements) than the correlation investigated in Bell’s
theorem. Based on an analysis of the correlations in different Lorentz
frames, I prove that unitary single-world theories are incompatible with
special relativity, and in order to avoid the incompatibility, there must
exist a preferred Lorentz frame in these theories. Moreover, I argue
that the incompatibility proof also applies to a proper version of the
many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. This closes the
major theoretical loopholes of Bell’s theorem, including relationalism,
retrocausality, and superdeterminism.
Finally, I argue that the stronger correlation found in the Gedanken-
experiment cannot be explained by retrocausal processes or even the
common causes in the past, but only be explained by nonlocal processes
or actions at a distance. This provides a test of unitary quantum the-
ories, as well as a further support for the new incompatibility proof
beyond Bell’s theorem.
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1 Introduction
It has been debated whether quantum mechanics and special relativity are
incompatible and whether there is a preferred Lorentz frame if they are
incompatible. In 1964, based on the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) ar-
gument [1], Bell derived an important result that was later called Bell’s
theorem [2]. It states that certain predictions of quantum mechanics cannot
be accounted for by a local realistic theory, and thus strongly suggests that
quantum mechanics and special relativity are incompatible. More than 50
years later [3, 4], although the loopholes in Bell test experiments have been
closed with advances in quantum technology [5-7], the theoretical loopholes
of Bell’s theorem are still there; there are unitary quantum theories (without
wave function collapse) which evade Bell’s theorem and claim that they are
compatible with special relativity, such as the many-worlds interpretation
of quantum mechanics (MWI) [8, 9], retrocausal theories [10-12], relational
quantum theories [13-16], and superdeterminism [17].
The main purpose of this paper is to close these theoretical loopholes of
Bell’s theorem, including the superdeterminism loophole. It will be argued
that a unitary quantum theory is incompatible with special relativity, and
in order to avoid the incompatibility, there must exist a preferred Lorentz
frame in the theory. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, I will first briefly analyze collapse theories of quantum mechanics to
which Bell’s theorem applies. It is pointed out that in these theories there
is a preferred Lorentz frame in which the collapse of the wave function is
simultaneous in different regions of space. From Section 3 to Section 5, I
will analyze unitary single-world quantum theories that assume the result of
each measurement is unique. In Section 3, I will propose a new Gedankenex-
periment, a variant of the EPR-Bohm experiment with a superobserver who
can undo a measurement. In this Gedankenexperiment, a stronger correla-
tion (between the results of two spacelike separated measurements) than the
correlation investigated in Bell’s theorem is found, which is the key to derive
a stronger result than Bell’s theorem. In Section 4, I will give a proof of the
incompatibility between unitary single-world theories and special relativity
based on an analysis of the stronger correlations in different Lorentz frames
in the Gedankenexperiment. It is argued that in order to avoid the incom-
patibility, there must exist a preferred Lorentz frame in a unitary quantum
theory.
In Section 5, I will analyze the implications of this new result for unitary
single-world theories. If the result holds true in a theory but the theory can-
not explain the stronger correlation in the Gedankenexperiment and further
accommodate a preferred Lorentz frame, then the theory will be inconsis-
tent or even wrong. First, it is pointed out that the incompatibility result
is valid in non-relational quantum theories such as superdeterminism and
retrocausal theories. Moreover, a relationism loophole of the proof is closed;
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it is argued that relational quantum theories cannot evade the incompati-
bility result either. Next, it is argued that (local) superdeterminism, which
may explain the correlations in Bell’s theorem in principle, cannot explain
the stronger correlation in the Gedankenexperiment. Third, it is argued that
retrocausal theories cannot explain the stronger correlation in the Gedanken-
experiment either. Fourth, it is shown that the correlation can be naturally
explained by nonlocal processes or actions at a distance in a nonlocal theory
such as Bohm’s theory. Sixth, other non-ψ-ontic quantum theories such as
consistent histories and QBism are briefly analyzed. It is argued that if the
superobserver’s reset operation in the Gedankenexperiment is valid in these
theories, then the incompatibility proof will apply to them. In Section 6, I
will analyze the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI)
that rejects unique measurement results. It is argued that the incompatibil-
ity proof also applies to a proper version of MWI. Conclusions are given in
the last section.
2 Collapse theories of quantum mechanics
Consider a usual EPR-Bohm experiment. There are two observers Alice and
Bob who are in their separate laboratories and share an EPR pair of spin
1/2 particles in the spin singlet state:
1√
2
(|↑〉1 |↓〉2 − |↓〉1 |↑〉2). (1)
Alice measures the spin of particle 1 at angle a, and Bob measures the spin of
particle 2 at angle b. These two measurements can be spacelike separation.
Each measurement result is +1 or −1, corresponding to spin up or spin
down. Then we can calculate the probabilistic correlation function E(a, b)
for Alice’s and Bob’s measurement results according to the Born rule, which
is E(a, b) = −cos(a − b). In particular, in the EPR anti-correlation case of
b = a, we have E(a, b) = −1, which means that when Alice’s result is +1,
Bob’s result is −1, and vice versa.
There are two categories of quantum theories which can explain the EPR
correlations, unitary quantum theories without wave function collapse and
collapse theories [18]. I will first consider collapse theories briefly and then
consider unitary quantum theories in more detail. In collapse theories, the
collapse of the wave function is simultaneous in different regions of space
in a preferred Lorentz frame. Suppose Alice first measures particle 1 in the
above example. Then, in the preferred Lorentz frame, Alice’s measurement
on particle 1 instantaneously influences the state of particle 2 (as well as
the state of particle 1)1, and the dynamical collapse of the entangled state
1Here I omit the finite collapse time, which can be made arbitrarily short in principle.
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of particles 1 and 2 due to Alice’s measurement happens simultaneously in
the regions of particles 1 and 2, no matter how far apart they are.
Due to the existence of a preferred Lorentz frame, collapse theories are
incompatible with special relativity (see also [19]).2 This is reflected in two
aspects. The first aspect is the violation of the Lorentz invariance of the
relation of temporal precedence (i.e. causes always preceding their effects
temporally). In the preferred Lorentz frame, causes always precede their ef-
fects temporally. For example, in this frame, Alice’s measurement as a cause
temporally precede the change of the state of particle 2 as its effect. But in
some other Lorentz frames, due to the Lorentz transformations, causes tem-
porally follow their effects, e.g. Alice’s measurement as a cause temporally
follows the change of the state of particle 2 as its effect.
The second aspect is the violation of the Lorentz invariance of the Born
rule. In the preferred Lorentz frame, since the collapse of the wave function
is simultaneous in different regions of space, the integral of the modulus
squared of the wave function defined at a given instant in the whole space
is always one, and the Born rule is always satisfied. However, in all other
Lorentz frames, since the collapse of the wave function is not simultaneous
in different regions of space, the integral of the modulus squared of the wave
function defined at a given instant in the whole space is not one. As a result,
the total probability as given by the integral is not one, and the Born rule is
violated. In other words, the modulus squared of the wave function defined
at a given instant cannot be interpreted as a probability as required by the
Born rule. Note that in these Lorentz frames, the integral of the modulus
squared of the wave function in different regions at different appropriate
instants is still one, and just because the collapse of the wave function is not
simultaneous in different regions of space either, the total probability for
collapse results or measurement results is still one, and thus the violation of
the Born rule cannot be measured (see Gao, 2017).
3 An EPR-Bohm experiment with superobserver
Now let’s consider unitary quantum theories. In these theories, Alice’s mea-
surement on particle 1 does not collapse the entangled state of particles 1
and 2, and in particular, it does not collapse the state of particle 2 which
may be far away from particle 1. Thus it seems that unitary quantum the-
ories can be compatible with special relativity. As we will see, however,
this is not the case. The key is to notice that in unitary quantum theories,
Alice’s measurement on particle 1 can be undone locally without interacting
with particle 2 and Bob so that the wave function of all systems, including
2This raises an interesting issue of whether the relativistic versions of collapse theories
proposed so far are fully relativistic [20-22]. For a recent review see [23].
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particle 2, can be reset to the initial one,3 and this permits the existence
of a stronger correlation between Alice’s and Bob’s measurement results,
which can reveal the incompatibility between unitary quantum theories and
special relativity.
There are two categories of unitary quantum theories: single-world the-
ories and many-worlds theories. I will first analyze the single-world theories
in which the result of each measurement is unique. For the purpose of con-
venience, I will usually call unitary single-world theories unitary quantum
theories in the following, unless stated otherwise.
Consider a variant of the above EPR-Bohm experiment in which there
is an additional superobserver in Alice’s laboratory who can undo her mea-
surement.4 First, suppose in the laboratory frame (in which Alice’s and
Bob’s laboratories are at rest), Alice first measures the spin of particle 1
at angle a and obtains her result, then the superobserver undoes Alice’s
measurement (which restores the states of Alice and the particles to their
initial states), and then Alice measures again the spin of particle 1 at angle
a and obtains her second result, and then the superobserver undoes Alice’s
second measurement, and this process repeats a large number of times, and
finally Bob measures the spin of particle 2 at angle b = a. According to the
Born rule, the probability distribution of Alice’s results is P (+1) = 1/2 and
P (−1) = 1/2.
Next, suppose in the laboratory frame Bob first measures the spin of
particle 2 at angle b = a, and then Alice measures the spin of particle 1 at
angle a and obtains her result, and then the superobserver undoes Alice’s
measurement, and then Alice measures again the spin of particle 1 at angle
a and obtains her second result, and then the superobserver undoes Alice’s
second measurement, and this process in Alice’s side repeats a large number
of times. In this case, according to the Born rule, the probability distribution
of Alice’s results is P (+1) = 1 and P (−1) = 0 (when Bob’s result is −1) or
P (+1) = 0 and P (−1) = 1 (when Bob’s result is +1).
It can be seen that the results of Alice’s measurements are correlated
with Bob’s measurement, independently of whether Bob’s measurement is
spacelike separated from Alice’s measurements. When Bob does not make
a measurement before Alice’s measurements, Alice will obtain two different
results, spin up and spin down, with roughly equal frequency, while when
Bob makes a measurement before Alice’s measurements, Alice will always
3In collapse theories, however, Alice’s measurement on particle 1 cannot be undone
locally, since it will collapse the entangled state of particles 1 and 2 into a product state
of the two particles, each of which is in a definite spin state. This point is emphasized by
Dieks [16].
4There have been some discussions about superobservers and similar Gedankenexperi-
ments in the literature [24-30]. Note that for the purpose of my analysis the superobserver
only needs to restore the wave function of relevant systems. Even if there exist other states
of reality or hidden variables of these systems and they are changed by Alice’s measure-
ment, the superobserver needs not restore them.
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obtain the same result, either spin up or spin down. This is a stronger
correlation than the correlation investigated in Bell’s theorem. In fact, it
is the strongest correlation in a quantum theory where the no-signalling
theorem is valid; the correlation is only weaker than superluminal signalling.
Note that at the end of these experiments, all of Alice’s measurement results
are erased by the superobserver. Thus, the statistics of Alice’s results can
only be calculated from a theory, and it cannot be found by experiments.
This is consistent with the no-signaling theorem; the correlation cannot be
used for superluminal signalling.
4 A proof of the existence of a preferred Lorentz
frame
Notwithstanding its consistency with the no-signaling theorem, a unitary
quantum theory is incompatible with special relativity. I will give a rigorous
proof in this section.
Suppose in the laboratory frame Alice and the superobserver first make
their series of measurements and reset operations and then Bob makes his
measurement. Then Alice will obtain two different results, spin up and spin
down, with roughly equal frequency. When Bob’s measurement is spacelike
separated from Alice’s measurements, the following temporal order of events
in another inertial frame is permitted by special relativity.5 In this frame,
Bob first makes his measurement, and then Alice and the superobserver
make their series of measurements and reset operations. Then Alice will
obtain the same result each time, either spin up or spin down. Since the
results of the same measurement observed in two Lorentz frames should be
the same, there is a contradiction.6
One might have an immediate objection here. Even though Alice can
repeat her measurement many times, as noted above, she will not be able
to remember or report the statistics of these results in a unitary quantum
theory. Thus one may insist that the statistics of Alice’s results does not
exist. If there is no such a thing, then the above analysis based on it will
be invalid. This objection can be answered. That Alice cannot remember
or report the statistics of her results only means an impossibility of testing
certain predictions of a theory at the empirical level,7 while what I con-
sider here is whether the predictions of two theories are compatible at the
theoretical level. After all, the statistics of the results of Alice’s repeated
5Note that when the distance between Alice’s and Bob’s laboratories is very large and
the duration between Alice’s measurements and Bob’s measurement is very short, the
relative velocity between this inertial frame and the laboratory frame may be close to
zero.
6I will discuss Dieks’ perspectivalism [16] later, which denies that measurement results
are frame-independent.
7Admittedly, this does raise an interesting issue for philosophy of science.
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measurements in each Lorentz frame can be properly defined and also pre-
cisely predicted by a unitary quantum theory and special relativity.8 The
result I have derived above is just that the combination of these two theo-
ries will lead to a contradiction when considering their predictions for the
statistics of Alice’s results in different Lorentz frames.
In fact, a similar contradiction can also be derived without resorting to
the statistics of the results of Alice’s repeated measurements. Suppose in
the laboratory frame, Alice first measures the spin of particle 1 at angle a
and obtains her result, then the superobserver undoes Alice’s measurement,
which restores the states of Alice and the particles to their initial states,
and finally Bob measures the spin of particle 2 at angle b = a and obtains
his result. When Bob’s measurement is spacelike separated from the super-
observer’s reset operation, the following temporal order of events in another
Lorentz frame is permitted by special relativity. In this frame, Alice first
measures the spin of particle 1 at angle a and obtains her result, then Bob
measures the spin of particle 2 at angle b = a and obtains his result, and fi-
nally the superobserver undoes Alice’s measurement. According to the Born
rule, in this frame, when the result of Alice’s measurement is +1, the result
of Bob’s measurement must be −1 with certainty. On the other hand, in the
laboratory frame, when the result of Alice’s measurement is +1, the result
of Bob’s measurement cannot be −1 with certainty. The reason is that if
the result of Bob’s measurement is −1 with certainty, then if Alice makes
her second measurement her result will be +1 with certainty, which further
means that if Alice and the superobserver repeat their measurements and
reset operations a large number of times, Alice’s results will be all +1, which
violates the Born rule. Thus there is a contradiction.
This contradiction can be seen more clearly when considering measure-
ments on an ensemble of the EPR pairs of spin 1/2 particles in the spin
singlet state. Then, when the result of Alice’s measurement is +1, the re-
sult of Bob’s measurement may be +1 sometimes in the laboratory frame
(where Alice’s measurement is undone before Bob’s measurement), while
in another Lorentz frame where Alice’s measurement is undone after Bob’s
measurement, the result of Bob’s measurement is always −1. Note again
that the results of the same measurement observed in two inertial frames
are the same. Thus we have a contradiction.
The contradiction is more obvious when assuming Alice’s and Bob’s
measurement operations are independent of each other (e.g. no superde-
terminism). In this case, when Alice’s measurement is undone before Bob’s
measurement, Alice’s and Bob’s measurements are equivalent to two inde-
pendent measurements on two spin singlet states, and thus their measure-
8In addition, it is worth pointing out that whether the statistics of Alice’s results
exists or not (when she cannot remember or report the statistics) does not depend on any
quantum theory, and it is purely a classical issue.
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ment results will be independent of each other. This means that when the
result of Alice’s measurement is +1, the result of Bob’s measurement may
be +1 or −1 with the same probability 1/2 in the laboratory frame, while
in another Lorentz frame where Alice’s measurement is undone after Bob’s
measurement, the result of Bob’s measurement is always −1 (see also [16]).
Thus the contradiction will appear with probability 1/2.
The existence of the above contradiction means that a unitary quantum
theory is incompatible with special relativity. Moreover, a unitary quantum
theory can be valid only in a preferred Lorentz frame. For if there existed
two Lorentz frames in which a unitary quantum theory is valid, then we
could arrange the temporal order of Alice’s and Bob’s measurements so
that the predictions of the theory in the two Lorentz frames contradict each
other as shown above.9 This means that in a unitary quantum theory there
must exist a preferred Lorentz frame, in which the temporal order of events
is real and the predictions of the theory are always true, while in other
Lorentz frames the temporal order of events is not real and the predictions
of the theory cannot be always true.10
5 A test of unitary quantum theories
It is well known that there are unitary single-world theories which evade
Bell’s theorem. Examples include relational quantum theories, such as re-
lational quantum mechanics [13, 14] and perspectivalism [15, 16], and non-
relational quantum theories, such as retrocausal theories [10-12] and su-
perdeterminism [17]. It is widely thought that these theories can explain
the Bell inequality-violating correlations predicted by quantum mechanics
and are also compatible with special relativity. In this section, I will analyze
the implications of the above incompatibility result on these theories. There
are two possible implications. One is that although a theory can evade Bell’s
theorem, it cannot evade the above result, and thus the popular view that
the theory is compatible with special relativity is wrong. The other is that
the above result holds true in a theory but the theory cannot explain the
stronger correlation (that is used to prove the result) and further accommo-
date a preferred Lorentz frame, and thus the theory is inconsistent or even
wrong.
9Here the invariance of the one-way speed of light or standard synchrony is assumed as
usual. If one adopts the convention of nonstandard synchrony that restores the absolute-
ness of simultaneity (see, e.g. [31], chap. 9), then a unitary quantum theory can be valid
in all Lorentz frames. But the one-way speed of light will be not isotropic in all but one
Lorentz frame, and thus the non-invariance of the one-way speed of light will also single
out a preferred Lorentz frame, in which the one-way speed of light is isotropic.
10Similar results have also been obtained in [32, 33].
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5.1 The proof reconsidered: closing the relationism loophole
In non-relational quantum theories such as retrocausal theories and superde-
terminism, physical facts such as measurement results are the same relative
to all physical systems including all Lorentz frames. In particular, the re-
sults of the same measurement observed in two Lorentz frames are the same.
Thus, the above incompatibility proof is valid in these theories. In a Lorentz
frame in which Alice and the superobserver first make their series of mea-
surements and reset operations and then Bob makes his measurement, Alice
will obtain two different results, spin up and spin down, with roughly equal
frequency according to the Born rule. When Bob’s measurement is space-
like separated from Alice’s measurements, special relativity permits the ex-
istence of another Lorentz frame in which Bob first makes his measurement
and then Alice and the superobserver make their series of measurements and
reset operations. In this frame, Alice will obtain the same result each time,
either spin up or spin down, according to the Born rule. Since the results
of Alice’s measurement observed in these two Lorentz frames are the same,
there is a contradiction. The existence of this contradiction means that
retrocausal theories and superdeterministic theories, if they are consistent
with these predictions of quantum mechanics, are also incompatible with
special relativity, and in these theories there should also exist a preferred
Lorentz frame, only in which the temporal order of events is real and the
predictions of these theories are always true.
In relational quantum mechanics [13, 14], physical facts or events such as
measurement results may be different relative to different physical systems.
But this theory does not explicitly claim that measurement results are frame-
dependent. For example, in this theory, Lorentz transformations does not
translate a measurement result such as x-spin up in one Lorentz frame into
another result such as x-spin down in another Lorentz frame, and the results
of the same measurement observed in two Lorentz frames are always the
same. Thus, relational quantum mechanics cannot avoid the incompatibility
result either. In other words, this theory is also incompatible with special
relativity, and there should also exist a preferred Lorentz frame in the theory.
Finally, perspectivalism does assume that measurement results are frame-
dependent [15, 16] On this view, Lorentz transformations can translate a
measurement result such as x-spin up in one Lorentz frame into another
result such as x-spin down in another Lorentz frame. Thus, at first sight,
perspectivalism, different from relational quantum mechanics, may avoid
the incompatibility result. Indeed, this seems to be the only way to permit
that single-world quantum mechanics and special relativity are compatible.
However, this view seems too radical. In Healey’s words, physical facts such
as measurement results are no longer objective on this view [30]. As Dieks
also admitted, “Accepting that physical properties are not monadic and lo-
cally defined, but rather perspectival, relational or hyperplane dependent
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is a huge step away from everyday experience and from the intuitions that
served us so well in nonquantum physics.” [16]
Moreover, a further analysis seems to indicate that even perspectivalism
cannot avoid the incompatibility between quantum mechanics and special
relativity. In order to avoid the incompatibility, the Lorentz transformations
need to translate the distribution of Alice’s results in one frame into the
distribution of her results in another frame, such as translating two different
results, x-spin up and x-spin down, with roughly equal frequency into the
same result each time, either x-spin up or x-spin down. It is obvious that
a definite translation rule cannot do this, since any definite translation rule
always translate the same result each time into the same result each time.
On the other hand, if the translation rule is random, it is hard to imagine
how it can translate two different results with roughly equal frequency into
the same result each time.
Even if perspectivalism can avoid the incompatibility result by assuming
that measurement results are frame-dependent, this view alone cannot ex-
plain the stronger correlation between the results of Alice’s measurements
and Bob’s measurement choice in one Lorentz frame (when these two mea-
surements are spacelike separated). Moreover, the correlation also poses fur-
ther difficulties for the Lorentz transformations of Alice’s results discussed
above, since it requires that the transformations should depend on Bob’s
measurement choice; when Bob measures the spin of particle 2 at angle
b 6= a, the Lorentz transformations of Alice’s results should be different
from those for the anti-correlation case of b = a.
The stronger correlation between the results of Alice’s measurements and
Bob’s measurement choice also poses a challenge for non-relational quantum
theories such as superdeterminism and retrocausal theories. Can these the-
ories explain the correlation? I will try to answer this question in the next
sections.
5.2 Superdeterminism
Let’s first see superdeterminism. Superdeterminism admits the relation
of temporal precedence but does not use it to explain the correlation be-
tween the results of Alice’s measurements and Bob’s measurement choice in
a Lorentz frame. Rather, it resorts to the common cause of these two mea-
surements in the past to explain the correlation. Then, since the dynamics
of a superdeterministic theory is supposed to be local (in order to avoid
the nonlocality implication of Bell’s theorem) [17], even if the correlation
depends on the time difference between these two measurements, the de-
pendence relation is arguably continuous, which means that when the time
difference between these two measurements is arbitrarily small, the differ-
ence between the correlations is also arbitrarily small. In other words, the
correlation between the results of Alice’s measurements and Bob’s measure-
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ment choice does not depend on the temporal order of Alice’s measurements
and Bob’s measurement according to superdeterminism. But this contra-
dicts the predictions of quantum mechanics. No matter how small the time
difference between Alice’s measurements and Bob’s measurement, the cor-
relation for the case of Alice’s measurements preceding Bob’s measurement
and the correlation for the case of Bob’s measurement preceding Alice’s mea-
surements are always greatly different; when Alice’s measurements precedes
Bob’s measurement, Alice will obtain two different results, spin up and spin
down, with roughly equal frequency, while when Bob’s measurement pre-
cedes Alice’s measurements, Alice will obtain the same result each time,
either spin up or spin down.
Besides the difficulty to explain the correlation, a more serious issue
of a local superdeterministic theory (that evades Bell’s theorem) is that it
does not violate the equivalence of all Lorentz frames and thus cannot ac-
commodate a preferred Lorentz frame. This means that the existence of a
preferred Lorentz frame will exclude these theories. In fact, if superdeter-
minism cannot avoid the incompatibility between quantum mechanics and
special relativity, then it seems that there will be no good motivation to
pursue such a radical view.
If superdeterminism is untenable, and the correlation between the re-
sults of Alice’s measurements and Bob’s measurement choice does not result
from a common cause in the past, then the correlation must originate from
certain causal influences of Bob’s side on Alice’s side. In this case, there are
only two ways to explain the correlation: assuming the relation of temporal
precedence and resorting to nonlocal processes or actions at a distance, or re-
jecting the relation of temporal precedence and resorting to local retrocausal
processes.
5.3 Retrocausal theories
Now let’s see retrocausal theories. It has been argued that these theories can
provide a local, hidden-variables explanation of the Bell inequality-violating
correlations predicted by quantum mechanics [10-12]. The key assumption
is that in a Bell test experiment the measurement settings as a cause (in
the future) can affect the hidden-variable distribution during preparation
(in the past) by a retrocausal mechanism. For example, in the EPR-Bohm
experiment discussed before, Alice’s measurement setting a and Bob’s mea-
surement setting b may retrocausally affect the values of spin of the particles
1 and 2 along these directions (as hidden variables of the theory) during
preparation, so that these values are correlated in a way to be able to ex-
plain the correlations between Alice’s and Bob’s measurement results which
are assumed to directly reflect these values of spin.
It is well known that Bell’s theorem prohibits that the spin of the parti-
cles have definte values in all directions during preparation in a local hidden-
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variables theory. This is not a problem for a retrocausal theory to explain the
experiment, since during each run of experiment there are only two angles a
and b that can be set to measure the particle pair, and it is only necessary
for a retrocausal theory to ensure that the spin of the particles have defi-
nite values along these two directions and these values are correlated [10].
However, in a Gedankenexperiment with superobservers, since Alice’s and
Bob’s measurements can both be undone locally, a Bell test experiment can
be repeatedly made on the same particle pair with all possible angles of a
and b. Thus, a retrocausal theory will need to ensure that the spin of the
particles have definite values along all directions. But this contradicts Bell’s
theorem.
In addition, it seems that a retrocausal theory cannot explain the stronger
correlation between the results of Alice’s measurements and Bob’s measure-
ment choice in the previous Gedankenexperiments either. Consider the case
that Bob first measures the spin of particle 2 at an arbitrary angle b, and
then Alice measures the spin of particle 1 at the same angle b and obtains her
result. A retrocausal theory can explain the perfect anti-correlation between
the two results by a retrocausal mechanism. For example, Alice’s and Bob’s
measurement settings retrocausally affects the values of spin of the particles
1 and 2 along the direction b during preparation so that these values are
anti-correlated. Then Alice’s and Bob’s spin measurements directly reflect
these values of spin, and thus their results are also anti-correlated.
But a problem appears when the superobserver undoes Alice’s measure-
ment and then Alice measures again the spin of particle 1 at angle b and
obtains her second result. Since the superobserver’s reset operation is lo-
cal, it does not affect either particle 2 and Bob or the preparation source
retrocausally. Moreover, since the superobserver’s reset operation is not
necessarily an exact time-reversal, and it only needs to restore the wave
function of relevant systems to their initial state, it will not restore the val-
ues of all hidden variables such as the spin of particle 1 to their initial values
in general. Thus, when Alice measures again the spin of particle 1 at angle
b, her second result may be different from her first result and thus will be
not anti-correlated with Bob’s result. This contradicts the predictions of
quantum mechanics.
5.4 Bohm’s theory
If a local theory such as superdeterminism and a retrocausal theory can-
not explain the correlation, then the correlation can only be explained by
nonlocal processes or actions at a distance. A well-known example of such
nonlocal theories is Bohm’s theory [34].
According to Bohm’s theory, a complete realistic description of a quan-
tum system is provided by the configuration defined by the positions of
its particles together with its wave function. The Bohmian laws of motion
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are expressed by two equations: a guiding equation for the configuration of
particles and the usual Schro¨dinger equation, describing the time evolution
of the wave function which enters the guiding equation. A major feature
of Bohm’s theory relevant to my following analysis is that the theory is
manifestly nonlocal. According to the guiding equation, the velocity of any
particle of a many-particle system depends on the positions of the other
particles when the wave function of the system is entangled, no matter how
far apart these particles are.
Consider the case that Bob first measures the spin of particle 2 at an
arbitrary angle b, and then Alice measures the spin of particle 1 at the same
angle b and obtains her result. According to the Bohmian laws of motion,
immediately after Bob’s measurement, particle 2 will stay in one branch of
the spin singlet state corrresponding to the measurement result, such as the
b-spin up branch corrresponding to the b-spin up result. Then, according
to the guiding equation, the motion of particle 2 will be determined only
by its b-spin up wave function, and correspondingly, the motion of particle
1 will be determined only by its b-spin down wave function, not by the
whole spin singlet state. Here there is a genuine action at a distance; Bob’s
measurement instantaneously influences particle 1 in Alice’s side. Then,
when Alice measures the spin of particle 1 at angle b, her result must be b-
spin up, which is perfectly anti-correlated with Bob’s result. Moreover, when
the superobserver undoes Alice’s measurement and Alice measures again the
spin of particle 1 at angle b, she will also obtain the same b-spin up result.
This is because according to the guiding equation, the motion of particle 1
nonlocally depends on the position of particle 2, and since particle 2 stays
in its b-spin up wave function, the motion of particle 1 is still determined by
its b-spin down wave function.
On the other hand, when Alice and the superobserver first make their
series of measurements and reset operations and then Bob makes his mea-
surement, Bob’s measurement does not influence the results of Alice’s mea-
surements, which are determined only by the initial position of particle 1
according to the guiding equation. Since the initial position of particle 1
satisfies the Born rule, Alice will obtain two different results, spin up and
spin down, with roughly equal frequency. In this way, Bohm’s theory can
explain the stronger correlation between the results of Alice’s measurements
and Bob’s measurement choice.
It has been shown that in Bohm’s theory, the joint distributions given
by the Born rule for position measurements cannot in general agree with the
distributions of the actual Bohmian particle positions in all Lorentz frames
[35]. This is not beyond expectations due to the existence of action at a
distance in the theory. Moreover, a similar result has been obtained in other
hidden-variable theories such as the modal interpretation [36]; it is shown
that in these theories special relativity is violated and a preferred Lorentz
frame exists at the assumed ontological level. The incompatibility proof
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given previously further shows that a preferred Lorentz frame must also
exist in hidden-variable theories when considering only actually observed
measurement results (see also [33]).
It is worth noting that in deterministic hidden-variable theories such as
Bohm’s theory, when the superobserver’s reset operation is an exact time-
reversal, it will also restore the values of all hidden variables such as the
positions of all Bohmian particles to their initial values. Then, in the previ-
ous Gedankenexperiments, the results of Alice’s measurements will be all the
same, independently of Bob’s measurement11, and thus the incompatibility
proof cannot go through. As noted before, however, the superobserver’s
reset operation is not necessarily an exact time-reversal in general, and it
only needs to restore the wave function of Alice and the spin wave function
of the particles to their initial states. Therefore, the incompatibility proof
still applies to deterministic hidden-variable theories.12
5.5 Other unitary quantum theories
How about other unitary quantum theories? As I have argued above, if a
unitary quantum theory assumes that measurement results are unique and
not frame-dependent, then the incompatibility proof will directly apply to
the theory.
Here an interesting issue may appear, which is to determine whether a
quantum theory is a unitary quantum theory. A unitary quantum theory
is composed of the universal Schro¨dinger equation and the Born rule. The
universality of the linear Schro¨dinger equation requires that the wave func-
tion never collapses (either ontologically or epistemically), and thus permits
that a measurement such as Alice’s measurement can be undone by a su-
perobserver in principle (i.e. the wave function of the measured system and
the measuring device after a measurement can be reset to the initial one).
The Born rule says that the modulus squared of the wave function gives the
probabilities of possible measurement results. A unitary quantum theory
thus defined may be regarded as the core of quantum mechanics, and it
does not depend on any particular interpretation of the theory, such as the
ontological status and meaning of the wave function and how to solve the
measurement problem.
Take the non-ψ-ontic quantum theories as an example. These theories
11In this case, when Bob makes his measurement at last, the statistics of Alice’s results
will violate the Born rule, and the violation may exist in all Lorentz frames. Although
this is understandable in a deterministic hidden-variable theory and does not contradict
existing experience either, it seems to suggest that an indeterministic hidden-variable
theory is more consistent with quantum mechanics [37-39].
12Interestingly, an analysis of the invariance of the results of Alice’s and Bob’s spacelike
separated measurements in different Lorentz frames also shows that deterministic (non-
local) hidden-variable theories are incompatible with special relativity and require the
existence of a preferred Lorentz frame [40].
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may include consistent histories [41], ψ-epistemic models [42], pragmatist
approaches to quantum mechanics [43], and QBism [44]. In these theories,
although the wave function is not real and thus the collapse of the wave
function is not a real physical process, the wave function may collapse at
the epistemic level or as part of a mathematical rule. Thus it seems debat-
able whether these theories belong to unitary quantum theories as defined
above. However, in the previous Gedankenexperiments, if only Alice’s mea-
surement does not influence Bob’s side instantaneously or faster than light,
it seems that we can still assign the same initial wave function to Alice, the
particles and Bob after the superobserver’s reset operation. If any of the
above theories accepts this, then the incompatibility proof will apply to it.
In other words, the theory will be also incompatible with special relativity.
6 Many worlds
Finally, let’s see the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI).
It is widely thought that MWI evades Bell’s theorem by rejecting unique
outcomes, and it is consistent with special relativity. Then, does the incom-
patibility result also hold true in MWI? I think the answer is positive.
Consider an EPR-Bohm experiment in which Bob first measures the
spin of particle 2 at an arbitrary angle b, and then Alice measures the spin
of particle 1 at the same angle b and obtains her result. According to
Wallace [45], from the point of view of another non-interacting observer, the
state of an observer after her measurement is indefinite, and the state of
the region is “a nonclassical state instantiating two sets of observers with
macroscopically different observations” [45, p.308]. But in the EPR-Bohm
experiment, after Bob first measures the spin of particle 2 at an angle b and
then Alice measures the spin of particle 1 at the same angle, the particle and
observer in each region already have definite spin and result states relative
to definite spin and result states of the particle and observer in the other
region. In the words of Brown and Timpson [9], “following the two local
measurements of Alice and Bob, from the point of view of one side, the
states of the systems in the other side already correspond to a definite,
perfectly anti-correlated, measurement result.” For example, from the point
of view of each version of Bob, such as B+ who obtains the result spin-up,
there is a unique version of Alice who already obtains a definite, perfectly
anti-correlated, measurement result, such as A− who obtains the result spin-
down. In the anti-correlation case or parallel case, unlike the non-parallel
cases,13 it is not required that a joint measurement should be performed,
13According to Brown and Timpson [9], in the non-parallel cases, we can only think of
the correlations between measurement results on the two sides of the experiment actually
obtaining in the overlap of the future light-cones of the measurement events, and thus
there will be no violation of special relativity [9].
15
comparing the results from Alice and Bob, which can only take place in the
overlap of the future light cones of the measurements of Alice and Bob [9].
This understanding of MWI is arguably proper. In MWI, although mea-
surement results are not unique, they are objective after all. For example,
after Bob performs his spin measurement, although there are two versions
of Bob, each version such as B+ already obtains a definite result such as
spin-up. Similarly, after Alice performs her spin measurement, although
there are two versions of Alice, each version such as A− already obtains a
definite result such as spin-down. Then, in the above EPR-Bohm experi-
ment, since the entangled state of the composite system including Alice and
Bob is nonlocal in MWI, and the nonlocal property of the composite sys-
tem ensures the perfect anti-correlation between the measurement results of
corresponding versions of Alice and Bob, the perfect anti-correlation should
exist immediately following their local measurements, not only after they
meet or a joint measurement is performed to compare their results.
If the perfect anti-correlation does not exist immediately following the
two local measurements of Alice and Bob, then when will it appear? When
a joint measurement is performed to compare the results, the perfect anti-
correlation will be confirmed. But it is obvious that the perfect anti-correlation
is not generated by the joint measurement; if Alice and Bob do not mea-
sure the spin of particles 1 and 2 at the same angle, then there will be no
necessarily perfect anti-correlation between their results. In addition, the
spreading out of the branching process from the local measurements of Alice
and Bob does not change the measurement result of each version of Alice or
Bob, and thus does not change the correlation between these results either.
Therefore, it is arguable that the perfect anti-correlation exists immediately
following the two local measurements of Alice and Bob.
This result does not cause problems in the usual EPR-Bohm experiment.
However, in the variant of the EPR-Bohm experiment with a superobserver,
it does cause a problem or a contradiction. In a Lorentz frame where Alice’s
measurement is undone after Bob’s measurement, from the point of view of
each version of Bob, such as B+ who obtains the result spin-up, there is
a unique version of Alice who obtains a definite, perfectly anti-correlated,
measurement result, such as A− who obtains the result spin-down. But
in the laboratory frame where Alice’s measurement is undone before Bob’s
measurement, from the point of view of each version of Bob, such as B+ who
obtains the result spin-up, there is no unique version of Alice who obtains
a definite, perfectly anti-correlated, measurement result, such as A− who
obtains the result spin-down. This is similar to the argument in the single-
world theories (see Section 4).
Also like the single-world theories, the contradiction is more obvious
when considering that Alice’s and Bob’s measurement operations are inde-
pendent of each other when they are spacelike separated in MWI. In this
case, when Alice’s measurement is undone before Bob’s measurement, Alice’s
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and Bob’s measurements are equivalent to two independent measurements
on two spin singlet states, and thus their measurement results will be in-
dependent of each other. This means that in the laboratory frame (where
Alice’s measurement is undone before Bob’s measurement), from the point
of view of each version of Bob, there are two versions of Alice, one of which
obtains a definite, perfectly anti-correlated measurement result, while the
other of which obtains a definite, perfectly correlated measurement result,
and the probability of each version is the same 1/2. But in another Lorentz
frame where Alice’s measurement is undone after Bob’s measurement, from
the point of view of each version of Bob, there is a unique version of Alice
who obtains a definite, perfectly anti-correlated, measurement result. Thus
the contradiction will appear with probability 1/2.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, I analyze the important issue of whether unitary quantum
theories are compatible with special relativity. I propose a new Gedankenex-
periment, a variant of the EPR-Bohm experiment with a superobserver who
can undo a measurement. In this Gedankenexperiment, there is a stronger
correlation (between the results of two spacelike separated measurements)
than the correlation investigated in Bell’s theorem. Based on an analysis
of the correlations in different Lorentz frames, I prove that unitary single-
world theories, including retrocausal theories and superdeterminism, are in-
compatible with special relativity, and in order to avoid the incompatibility,
there must exist a preferred Lorentz frame in these theories. Moreover, I
argue that the incompatibility proof also applies to a proper version of the
many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. This closes the major
theoretical loopholes of Bell’s theorem. Finally, I also analyze the implica-
tions of this new result for unitary quantum theories. It is argued that the
stronger correlation found in the Gedankenexperiment cannot be explained
by retrocausal processes or even the common causes in the past, but only
be explained by nonlocal processes or actions at a distance.
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